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The Shaky Foundation of “Statutory
Platforms”: A Comment on
Baier v. Alberta
Robert E. Charney

I. INTRODUCTION
While all eyes have focused on the constitutionalization of collective
bargaining by the Supreme Court in its B.C. Health Services1 decision,
another Supreme Court decision from 2007 also considered a
constitutional issue that related directly to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms2 and collective bargaining. Baier v. Alberta3 was a
freedom of expression case and considered the validity of provincial
legislation that disqualified schoolteachers from serving as school board
trustees. The majority of the Court upheld the validity of this statute,
finding that while serving as a school trustee is an expressive activity,
the province had no obligation to provide teachers with a “statutory
platform for expression” and there was, therefore, no infringement of
Charter section 2(b).
While I agree with the result of the majority’s decision, I believe that
they erred in seeing this as a freedom of expression case at all. The
impugned legislation did not disqualify schoolteachers from speaking;
they were free to express their views and opinions on any issues relating

General Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not represent the position of the
Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. I disclose at the outset that I represented the Attorney
General of Ontario in its intervention in Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673
(S.C.C.), and was one of the counsel for Ontario in Ontario Public School Boards’ Assn. v. Ontario
(Attorney General), [1997] O.J. No. 3184, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 346 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), discussed
below. I would like to thank Daniel Engel for his research and editing assistance in the preparation
of this paper.
1
Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.).
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
[2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baier”].
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to education whether or not they were qualified or elected as school
board trustees. What the teachers sought was neither a freedom to
express their opinions nor a platform of expression, but a right to
participate in the management of the schools. While freedom of
association may now guarantee the right of workers to bargain
collectively, surely freedom of expression does not expand that into a
right of workers to sit on both sides of the bargaining table.

II. FACTS
At issue in this case was the constitutional validity of a 2004
amendment to the Alberta Local Authorities Election Act,4 which set out
the qualifications required to be a candidate for and to serve as a school
trustee.5 Prior to the 2004 amendment, school employees could not run
for elections as a school trustee in the jurisdiction in which they were
employed (“own employer restriction”) unless they were on a leave of
absence. If elected, the employee was deemed to have resigned on “the
day the employee takes the official oath of office as an elected official”.6
If not elected, the employee could return to work. In 2004, Alberta
expanded the “own employer” restriction into a province-wide restriction
on school employees serving as school trustees on any Alberta school
board. Accordingly, the deemed resignation provision applied even
when a school employee is elected to a school board that is not his or her
employer.
The legislation was challenged by the Alberta Teachers’ Association,
a trio of teachers who were serving as school trustees on school boards
that did not employ them, and a teacher who intended to seek election to
a school board.

III. THE “STATUTORY PLATFORMS” DOCTRINE
The majority decision, written by Rothstein J., treated this case as a
statutory platform case, reiterating a long line of cases starting with Haig
v. Canada,7 which have held that freedom of expression generally only
4

R.S.A. 2000, c. L-21 [hereinafter “LAEA”].
Id., s. 22.
6
Id., s. 22(9).
7
Haig v. Canada; Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993]
2 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”].
5
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imposes a negative obligation on government rather than a positive
obligation of protection or assistance. Thus, if the government chooses
to establish a specific means or statutory platform for expression, it has
no obligation to extend that means or platform to everyone. In Haig, the
Supreme Court decided that a referendum is a “statutorily created
platform for expression” and held that:
A government is under no constitutional obligation to extend this
platform of expression to anyone, let alone to everyone. A referendum
as a platform of expression is, in my view, a matter of legislative
policy and not of constitutional law. 8

The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that in “exceptional
cases” positive government action could be required under Charter
section 2. In Dunmore v. Ontario, the Court set out the three factors that
were relevant to establishing this exception, which, the Court held, were
applicable to section 2 in general:
(1) Claims of underinclusion should be grounded in fundamental Charter
freedoms rather than in access to a particular statutory regime.
(2) The claimant must meet an evidentiary burden of demonstrating that
exclusion from a statutory regime permits a substantial interference
with activity protected under section 2, or that the purpose of the
exclusion was to infringe such activity. The exercise of a
fundamental freedom need not be impossible, but the claimant must
seek more than a particular channel for exercising his or her
fundamental freedoms.
(3) The state must be responsible for the inability to exercise the
fundamental freedom:
[U]nderinclusive state action falls into suspicion not simply to the
extent it discriminates against an unprotected class, but to the extent it
substantially orchestrates, encourages or sustains the violation of
fundamental freedoms.9

In Baier the Court refined this test for the specific application of
Charter section 2(b):
In cases where a government defending a Charter challenge alleges, or
the Charter claimant concedes, that a positive rights claim is being
8

Id., at para. 83.
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at
paras. 24-33 (S.C.C.).
9
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made under s. 2(b), a court must proceed in the following way. First it
must consider whether the activity for which the claimant seeks s. 2(b)
protection is a form of expression. If so, then second, the court must
determine if the claimant claims a positive entitlement to government
action, or simply the right to be free from government interference. If it
is a positive rights claim, then third, the three Dunmore factors must be
considered.10

Thus, the threshold issue in such cases is whether the activity at
issue is a form of expression. In this case there were actually two
separate activities at issue: (1) being a candidate for trustee; and (2)
serving as a trustee. It was conceded by Alberta that the first activity was
expressive, while it was acknowledged that “some of the activities of
school trustees may be characterized as having an expressive nature”.11
The majority concluded that both activities were expressive activities
within the meaning of Charter section 2(b), and both amounted to claims
to a positive entitlement or statutory platform for expression.
Having passed the threshold issues, the Court proceeded to the threepart Dunmore test and concluded that the appellants were not able to
meet the first two of the three factors:
(1) the claim related to access to a particular statutory regime (school
trusteeship) which is not a fundamental Charter freedom; and
(2) exclusion from that statutory regime did not substantially interfere
with school employees’ freedom to express themselves in relation to
school board operations or the education system generally.12
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the
constitutional validity of the impugned statute.
The concurring decision written by LeBel J. characterized the
teachers’ claim as seeking “a right to participate in a political and
managerial function in a democratically elected public body, namely a
school board.”13 In his view the guarantee of freedom of expression did
not protect “a right to run for office as a school trustee and, if elected, to
take part in the management of the school board.”14 While the concurring
opinion recognized that “some significant aspects of the role of a school
trustee involve the communication of ideas about education and the
10
11
12
13
14

Baier, supra, note 3, at para. 30.
Id., at paras. 31, 81.
Id. at paras. 44-45.
Id., at para. 72.
Id.
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operation of schools … that content of expression is not affected by the
LAEA Amendments.”15 Justice LeBel found that the appellants were not
being deprived of freedom of expression but rather “a claimed right to
take part in the management of Alberta’s local education systems”
which, in the view of Lebel J., is not protected by section 2(b) of the
Charter.16
Finally, LeBel J. recognized that:
… nearly everything people do creates opportunities for expression if
‘expression ‘ is viewed expansively enough. … At some point, one
must question whether the guarantee of freedom of expression should
be viewed so broadly that every human activity with a communicative
content might be swept under it.17

Accordingly, since the management of school boards is not a
constitutionally guaranteed right under the Charter, he concluded that
there was no infringement of section 2(b) without having to consider
“the delicate distinction between positive and negative rights”.18
Justice Fish dissented, concluding that the amendment infringed
section 2(b) because Alberta “removed the appellants from an existing
platform of expression to which, like other qualified members of the
public, they have long had access”.19 Furthermore, “seeking and holding
office as a school trustee, however, is a uniquely effective means of
expressing one’s views on education policy”,20 and therefore the
exclusion of school employees from running “substantially interfered”
with their freedom of expression. According to Fish J., any policy
justification for this restriction had to be justified under section 1 of the
Charter, and the government’s concerns regarding conflict of interest
could be met by the “own employer” restrictions, which existed before
the 2004 amendment.21

15

Id., at para. 75.
Id., at para. 75.
17
Id., at para. 76.
18
Id., at para. 76.
19
Id., at para. 82.
20
Id., at para. 107.
21
Id., at paras. 82, 107-21. In addition, the Court unanimously rejected the appellant’s
s. 15(1) claim, holding that the distinction challenged in this case — occupational status — is not an
analogous ground of discrimination under that section.
16
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IV. COMMENT
While the statutory platform analysis may be helpful in other
contexts, in this case it misses the mark. Not only did the law in issue not
substantially interfere with teachers’ freedom of expression, it did not
interfere with it at all. The statutory platform analysis may make sense in
the context of an activity that is exclusively or primarily expressive, such
as voting in a referendum. It is ill fitted, however, in the context of an
activity — such as working in a particular job — which is only
incidentally expressive. While Alberta conceded that some of the
activities of school trustees can be characterized as expressive,22 the
same concession could be made with respect to virtually every job, from
school teacher, to school principal, to being a judge on the Supreme
Court. Butchers and bakers often engage in activities that can be
characterized as expressive, and most jobs would meet the broad
definition of statutory platform posited by the majority. While the
expressive activities themselves should be protected by section 2(b), it
surely overshoots the purpose of the section to protect not only those
expressive activities but also the right to qualify for a particular job.
If the majority’s analysis were correct, every bona fide qualification
for public employment or office and every statutory qualification for
private employment would engage the Dunmore analysis. For example, a
requirement that teachers must have certain academic qualifications or
that candidates for election for bencher in the Law Society must be
lawyers would limit access to those particular platforms for expression.
Similarly, academic and professional qualifications for practising as a
health care practitioner limit access to that occupation as a platform for
expression. While each of these positions is undoubtedly a uniquely
effective means of expressing one’s views on a variety of subjects, no
one has to be a teacher, a Law Society bencher or a doctor in order to
express his or her opinions on any subject (let alone education, law or
health care). Therefore, the reality is that no one could ever meet the
three-part Dunmore test and actually prove a violation of Charter,
section 2(b). While there may be no harm in setting up a constitutional
test that no one can meet, we must at least call into question the validity,
relevance and utility of any legal analysis that creates such an
insurmountable hurdle.

22

Id., note 3, at paras. 31, 81.
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Even Fish J.’s dissenting opinion seems to recognize that bona fide
qualifications for a job or office do not infringe on freedom of
expression, although he makes little attempt to explain how we know in
advance of the section 1 analysis which qualifications infringe section
2(b) and which do not. For example, he states that the:
decisive question on this appeal is whether a legislature which sets up a
system of democratically elected boards to administer a fundamental
aspect of government activity may then exclude a certain category or
group of otherwise qualified persons from serving on those boards,
without any need to justify that exclusion under s.1 of the Charter. 23
(emphasis added)

Legislation establishing school boards generally imposes a number of
qualifications to be eligible for candidacy. Candidates must be Canadian
citizens, must be over 18 years of age and must reside in the school
district in which they run.24 In jurisdictions with coterminous linguistic or
denominational boards (English/French/Catholic) candidates must also
meet linguistic and denominational qualifications.25 However, freedom
of expression is not limited by citizenship, age, residence, language, or
denomination. When Fish J. refers to “otherwise qualified persons” he
appears to assume that these other qualifications would not infringe
Charter section 2(b), although it is by no means clear why they would
not. Non-citizens, for example, could credibly claim to be a “category or
group of otherwise qualified persons”,26 who should have just as much
right to express their opinions regarding education and the operation of
the schools as do teachers.27 It is equally unclear why the requirement
that a manager not be in a conflict of interest position would not also be
a bona fide qualification for that position. To be consistent, Fish J. would
have to conclude that any and every qualification for public office would
run afoul of section 2(b) and require justification under Charter section 1.

23

Id., at para. 86. Justice Fish also refers to “otherwise qualified persons” at para. 95.
See, e.g., Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2, s. 61(1) [hereinafter “EA”].
25
Id., s. 80(7).
26
Baier, supra, note 3, at para. 86.
27
Resident non-citizens have a legal right to send their children to public school without
payment of tuition. They are not, however, eligible to vote for trustees (or any other elected official
at the municipal, provincial or federal level) and are therefore not qualified to run as candidates. See
EA, supra, note 24, s. 32.
24
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V. THE LABOUR RELATIONS CONTEXT
In order to fully appreciate LeBel J.’s concurring decision, it is
helpful to consider the statutory role of school trustees and the special
statutory regime that governs teachers’ collective bargaining. The primary
function of school boards is to manage schools in a particular district.28
As such, the role of trustees on school boards is analogous to that of the
senior management in the labour relations context. The board is responsible
for hiring and removing teachers and other staff, for establishing the
terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining, for
the implementation of collective agreements and for disciplinary or
grievance issues. Collective bargaining issues account for approximately
80 per cent of the school board’s budget, and because of the special
nature of school board collective bargaining, collective agreements made
in one school board often have an impact on agreements in other boards.
The Labour Relations Act, 199529 clearly recognizes the importance
of workers and management being free from interference from one
another, and therefore prohibits either side from participating in the
administration of the other. The qualification requirements to serve on
school boards in both Alberta and Ontario are based on this common and
well-accepted principle. The justification for preventing management
from running for positions within a labour union is the same as, and as
valid as, the justification for preventing teachers from running for
positions on a school board. As the Ontario Labour Relations Board has
recognized: “The [Labour Relations] Act attempts to create a balance of
power between these two sides by insulating one from the other”.30
The insulation of management and labour is not just a valid labour
policy, it is a principle with constitutional significance. In the case of
Delisle v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada went so far as to hold

28
29

EA, supra, note 24, at ss. 171(3), 277.2(1).
S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A. See:

70. No employer or employer’s organization and no person acting on behalf of an
employer or employer’s organization shall participate in or interfere with the formation,
selection, or administration of a trade union …
71. No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall participate in
or interfere with the formation of or administration of an employers’ organization …
30
George W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law: A Comprehensive Text (Aurora, ON: Canada
Law Book Inc., 1985), at 264-68; Chrysler Canada Ltd., [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep. Aug. 396, at para. 12
(O.L.R.B.); see also Burnaby (District), [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 1, at 3-4 (B.C.L.R.B.).
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that management control over an employee association would infringe
freedom of association as guaranteed by Charter section 2(d).31
The 2004 amendment to the Alberta LAEA32 was by no means the
first time that teachers had been disqualified from holding office as
school board trustees. Similar disqualifications pre-date Confederation
and appear in the Common Schools Act of 1859.33
In fact, the Baier34 case was not the first case where Canadian courts
had to consider the constitutional validity of a statutory provision that
disqualified all school board employees in the province from the right to
hold office as a school board trustee. The constitutional validity of such
a provision was upheld by the Ontario Court (General Division) in the
1997 case Ontario Public School Boards’ Assn. v. Ontario.35
When OPSBA was first argued before the General Division, two
separate but related issues of trustee eligibility were raised. The first,
which was almost identical to the issue in Baier, was the disqualification
of all school board employees from the right to hold office as a school
board trustee (section 219(4)(a) of the Education Quality Improvement
Act36). The second issue was the disqualification of all school board
employee spouses from the right to hold office as a school board trustee
(section 219(4)(b) of the EQIA37). Both of these provisions were
challenged under section 15 of the Charter, and the employee
disqualification was also challenged under section 93 of the Constitution
Act, 1867.38 Interestingly, the Ontario Public School Boards Association
31
Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989,
at para. 37 (S.C.C.):

Since this Court’s decision in Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v.
Northwest Territories (Commissioner), it is clear that under the trade union certification
system, the government may limit access to mechanisms that facilitate labour relations to
one employee organization in particular, and impose certain technical rules on that
organization. It goes without saying that it must, however, be a genuine employee association
that management does not control. Otherwise, there would be a violation of s. 2(d).
32

Supra, note 4.
“No teacher shall hold the office of School Trustee or of Local Superintendent.” S.O.
1859, 22 Vict., c. 64, s. 81. This disqualification appears in the Consolidated Public School Act of
1874, 37 Vict., c. 28, s. 91 as follows: “No master or teacher of a Public or High School shall hold
the office of school board trustee or school inspector.”
34
Baier, supra, note 3.
35
[1997] O.J. No. 3184, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 346 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), vard [1999] O.J. No.
2473, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “OPSBA”]. This case is often referred to as the
“Fewer School Boards Case” because it dealt primarily with the amalgamation of smaller school
boards across the province.
36
S.O. 1997, c. 31 [hereinafter “EQIA”].
37
Id.
38
(U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
33
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did not raise section 2(b) of the Charter, likely because as a coalition of
school trustees, they understood that the role of trustee was more than
just a platform for expression.
In reliance on the evidence submitted in that case (including the
1991 Report of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Consultation
Committee to the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Municipal Conflict of
Interest Review) the General Division upheld the constitutional validity
of both of these disqualifications. The Court held that the purpose of
these provisions was to disqualify individuals who had a conflict of
interest in a substantial portion of the board’s work. School board
trustees are the managers of the school board, and a person cannot place
themselves on both sides of the bargaining table by being both a
manager and a union member. In upholding the school board employee
disqualification, the Court relied on the following comments from the
1991 Municipal Conflict of Interest Review:
The intent of these prohibitions is to ensure accountability and
impartiality in decision-making on matters affecting the operation of
the council, school board, or local board. It embodies the rule that no
person can serve as both master and servant.
A substantial number of individuals in the educational field, primarily
teachers, hold office on school boards, and the majority of matters
considered by school boards relate to educational programs and
policies, and labour-related issues which are usually consistent across
the province. Consequently, decisions made by one school board often
have an effect in another School board jurisdiction, which places these
members in a conflict of interest situation. The example cited most
often was collective bargaining.39

In addition to the evidence in that case, the General Division relied
on the “labour relations reality” reflected in cases like Benn v. Lozinski,40
which, based on evidence, concluded that the collective bargaining
agreements of one board have an impact on the agreements of other
boards. In Ontario, the Teaching Profession Act41 declares that every
teacher employed by a school board is a member of the Ontario
Teachers’ Federation (OTF),42 and under Part X.1 of the Education Act,
affiliated bodies of the OTF are the statutory bargaining agents of the
39
40
41
42

OPSBA, supra, note 35, at para. 78.
[1982] O.J. No. 3356, 37 O.R. (2d) 607 (Ont. Co. Ct.) [hereinafter “Benn”].
R.S.O. 1990, c. T.2.
Id., s. 4(1).
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teachers.43 Accordingly, a member of the Ontario Teachers’ Federation
was in a conflict by reason of his employment in a different board:
As a member of the Ontario Teachers’ Federation the respondent
would have an indirect pecuniary interest by reason of being a member
of a body that has an interest in a contract that is reasonably likely to
be affected by a decision of the local board. I base that finding on the
evidence before me of the scale of fees chargeable by the federation in
accordance with the salaries of the members. As well the federation is
vitally interested in practically all matters in which the local board is
concerned. It would be naive to think otherwise. Accordingly, he ought
to have availed himself to the provisions of s. 2(1) of the Act and
disclosed his interest.
Upon the evidence before me I find that generally a collective
bargaining agreement with one class of teachers will invariably affect a
subsequent agreement with another class of teachers. The agreement
invariably is used as a negotiating lever likely to influence financial
and other terms in collective bargaining agreements. I am therefore
prepared to find that the respondent was in conflict by reason of being
in the employment of a body that has an interest in a contract
reasonably likely to be affected by a decision of the local board. I am
therefore again of the view that he ought to have disclosed his interest,
not taken part in the consideration or discussion of or vote on any
question with respect to the contract or attempt to influence the voting.44

Similar concerns were identified by the British Columbia courts
when they considered the collective bargaining between school boards
and teachers’ unions in that province. In the case of Wynja v. HalseyBrandt the British Columbia Court of Appeal held:
On the evidence before him, the trial judge found there was a very
close relationship between the BCTF and its individual locals, including
the RTA and the VTF, and that as a matter of policy what happens
during the collective bargaining process involving one local has a “direct
and significant” bearing on negotiations and the terms of subsequent
collective agreements entered into by other locals. Everything the
locals do during the collective bargaining process is done under the
direction and guidance of the BCTF. The result is a close relationship
between the terms of employment of teachers in Richmond and the
terms of employment of teachers in Vancouver. It is this close relationship

43
44

Supra, note 24.
Benn, supra, note 40, at paras. 24-25.
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which the trial judge found gave the appellants an interest in the
Richmond collective agreement that could monetarily affect them.
.....
I do not propose to review all of the evidence, which was put before
the trial judge in affidavit form, and which established the very close
working relationship between the BCTF and its various locals,
including the VTF and the RTA. I am satisfied that the specific terms
of that relationship, as formally recognized in the Constitution and ByLaws of the various associations and in the Members’ Guide to the
BCTF, are a manifestation of the fact that … establishing consistent
working conditions and terms of employment, a fact which by itself
leads inexorably to the very conclusions reached by the trial judge. I
am not persuaded that he misconstrued the evidence before him or that
the conclusions he reached are unreasonable. Indeed, they seem to me
to be a matter of common sense.45

The General Division upheld the constitutional validity of both the
employee disqualification (section 219(4)(a) of the EQIA) and the
employee spouse disqualification (section 219(4)(b) of the EQIA). The
Ontario Public School Board Association appealed the employee
disqualification issue only on the basis that it infringed section 93 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. It did not appeal the General Division’s findings
that section 219(4)(a) did not infringe Charter section 15. The OPSBA
did appeal the decision that the employee spouse disqualification
(section 219(4)(b)) did not infringe section 15 of the Charter.
The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the employee
spouse disqualification discriminated on the basis of marital status
contrary to section 15(1) of the Charter, and that the section 1 evidence
did not justify discrimination on the basis of marital status. The Court
issued a declaration that section 219(4)(b) was invalid. Justice Brooke
dissented, noting that the evidence demonstrated that collective
bargaining issues relate “to matters that constitute about 80% of school
boards’ budgets and affect the efficiency and integrity of a board”.46 He
noted evidence that in some boards up to 50 per cent of trustees are
employees or spouses of employees.47

45

[1993] B.C.J. No. 1154, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 393, at paras. 8, 23 (B.C.C.A).
Ontario Public School Boards’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1999] O.J. No.
2473, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 609, at para. 84 (Ont. C.A.).
47
Id., at para. 84.
46
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The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the constitutional validity
of section 219(4)(a) (employee disqualification), concluding that it did
not infringe section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The Ontario Public
School Board Association did not seek leave to appeal from this
decision.48
The spousal disqualification provision (section 219(4)(b)) was
subsequently repealed in Ontario in 2002,49 but Ontario, like Alberta,
continues to disqualify all school board employees from holding office
as trustees.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is significant that the appellants in the Baier50 case did not contest
the provisions of the Act which disqualified teachers from holding the
office of school trustee in the board of their own employer. Accordingly
the issue in Baier was not whether teachers could be disqualified from
serving as school board trustees but rather the proper geographic scope
of the disqualification. Given the “labour relations reality” recognized by
both courts and government reports, the province-wide disqualification
is an appropriate policy response.
Freedom of expression does not guarantee the right to manage a
public institution. The position the appellants sought was membership on
a board that is responsible for management and control of the schools,
entering into the terms of the collective agreement with board employees
and the implementation of those collective agreements. While they are,
like all persons, free to express their views and opinions on such
subjects, they have no right to participate in the actual management of
the school boards.
There is a distinction to be drawn between the two activities at issue
in this case: (1) running as a candidate; and (2) serving as a trustee.
While the latter is primarily a managerial position which, like all jobs, is
incidentally expressive, the former is inherently expressive. Candidacy
for any public office may accurately be described as a statutory platform

48

Ontario sought leave to appeal the decision invalidating s. 219(4)(b) (spousal disqualification).
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed without reasons Ontario’s application for leave to appeal
on November 4, 1999: Ontario Public School Boards’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1999]
S.C.C.A. No. 425 (S.C.C.).
49
S.O. 2002, c. 18, Sched. G, s. 9(1).
50
Baier, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.).

128

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

for expression, and the majority’s statutory platform analysis was
legitimately applied to that activity.
In this regard, however, it is important to note that the statutory
provisions at issue in the LAEA51 did not really preclude teachers from
being candidates for trustee. Like virtually all public servants wanting to
run for public office, teachers were only required to request a leave of
absence in order to be a candidate, and the employer was required by law
to grant the leave of absence.52 Should the employee not be elected, he or
she had the right to return to work. The purpose of such laws is to
prevent public employees from being in a conflict of interest during the
election campaign, and from using their public employment to gain some
advantage during the campaign. The leave of absence requirement
presents a fairly insignificant obstacle to candidacy.53 A close reading of
the Queen’s Bench decision indicates that the teachers’ real concern was
not the financial impact of the leave of absence provision, but the
financial impact of the deemed resignation upon taking the oath of office.54
Finally, both the teachers’ arguments and Fish J.’s dissent emphasized
that holding office as a school trustee is “a uniquely effective means of
expressing one’s view on education policy”55 and that “service as a
trustee [is a] qualitatively different means of expression than simply
shouting from the sidelines.”56 True enough, but service as a trustee is
“uniquely effective” and “qualitatively different” precisely because it is
management rather than expression. Take away the management powers,
and the position of school trustee is no more effective a platform (and
perhaps much less so) than being a teacher.57

51

R.S.A. 2000, c. L-21.
Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sched., s. 30; Public Service of Ontario
Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 35, Sched. A, s. 79.
53
Jones v. Ontario (Attorney General); Rheaume v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1992]
O.J. No. 163, 7 O.R. (3d) 22, at 26 (Ont. C.A.).
54
Baier v. Alberta, [2004] A.J. No. 1003, [2005] 7 W.W.R. 68, at para. 80 (Alta. Q.B.):
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Given that there is a significant disparity between a teacher’s salary and trustee
remuneration, forcing a teacher to resign their employment for the duration of their term
as trustee renders illusory any opportunity for teachers to run for office as school trustees
under the LAEA Amendments.
55

Baier (2007), supra, note 50, at para. 107.
Id., at para. 108.
57
Even running as a candidate for election for a school trustee is a relatively ineffective
platform for expression. School board elections have notoriously low voter turnout. In the municipal
elections of 2006, voter turnout across the Greater Toronto Area averaged 39.3 per cent. In a byelection held by the Toronto District School Board in 2002, voter turnout was only 10 per cent.
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